The most popular applications at this shipping company have many thousands of users, so at first having roughly 10 percent of your users operating as administrators may not seem like that big a deal. But users should always be lowest privilege level, and having an excessive number of application administrators is as bad as having too many OS administrators. Every additional admin doesn’t just increase his or her own risk; if they’re compromised, they add to the takedown risk of all the others.
But no one had thought to do the same analysis on the application administrators (at least not until I came along — that’s why they pay me the big bucks). Even when they compromise the passwords of the entire domain and all the network administrators, what they are really after lies on application servers, which is why application administrators can do you in. I’ve done a few of these audits; it’s usually easy to find the problem children, and you can eliminate a lot of them.
My favorite applications are the RBAC (role-based access control) ones where almost no one is an admin, and even the admins are limited in what they can do.
That’s why I’m as worried about how a company controls and audits application administrators as I used to be about OS and network administrators.
Link: http://www.infoworld.com/d/security/too-many-admins-spoil-your-security-218023?source=rss_security